TIME Research Area · RWTH Aachen University · Work in progress
Welcome! Here you will find a concise overview of the SAFErGrid Economics Project, a work plan focusing on four interrelated macro-economic dimensions of the SAFErGrid Concept.

Point of departure · the SAFErGrid concept
SAFErGrid proposes to reorganise the power system into a layered, bottom-up architecture modelled on the internet's OSI stack. Instead of one continent-wide synchronous machine, the grid becomes a mesh of autonomous cells linked by smart Energy Routers and distributed storage buffers.
Compartmentalise the grid into autonomous “A-grids” that need no continent-wide synchronisation.
Smart Energy Routers link them, routing energy the way internet routers route data packets.
“Store-and-forward” decouples generation from consumption in time, using distributed storage buffers.
A fault stays inside its A-grid — it cannot cascade into a continent-wide blackout.
A
Aggregate
locally
F
Forward
to neighbours
S
Store
in buffers
C
Convert
e.g. to H₂
The AFSC routing principle of the Energy Routing Layer.
Fig. 1 · The four-layer SAFErGrid architecture
Energy Application Layer
Dynamic pricing, demand response, new business models
Energy Streaming Layer
Schedules energy across the grid; no instantaneous matching
Energy Routing Layer
Moves energy between A-grids via the AFSC principle
A-Grid Layer
Autonomous cell manages its own frequency and voltage
Layered, bottom-up — the common technological basis is distributed storage and smart Energy Routers.
Source: Based on Schwarz, S., Sahoo, S., Stoffers, M., and et al (2026). Resilient Low-Inertia Power Systems through Asynchronous Energy Balancing. Nat Reviews Electrical Engineering, 3:101–110.
The agenda for 2026–2027
Understanding the economics of a decentralised, asynchronous grid is the research agenda for 2026–2027. This workplan organises it around four interrelated macro-economic dimensions — four papers, four working streams — each asking a distinct question of the SAFErGrid concept: How do markets clear? How is inertia priced? What are the implications for innovation? What are the implications for household welfare? For each paper the sections below set out what it aims to address, how, and four priority areas for elaboration and improvement.
01
Market Design
Energy Balance & Dynamic Scarcity Pricing
How do markets clear?
02
The Economics of Inertia
Inertia as a Priced, Local Market Service
How is inertia priced?
03
Innovation Potential
Technology, Platforms & Real Options
What are the implications for innovation?
04
Reducing Energy Poverty
Lower and Fairer Household Bills
What are the implications for household welfare?
Working stream · Paper 01
01
How do markets clear?
Energy Balance & Dynamic Scarcity Pricing
€700+/MWh
intraday price swing in a single day (1 May 2026)
€0.5 → 4.2bn
German redispatch cost, 2014 → 2022
€584bn
EU grid investment needed this decade (EC, 2023)
Read the draft of paper 01 here →
What this work package addresses
The Continental Europe Synchronous Area is one 50 Hz machine spanning 32 countries: operators must solve instantaneous power balance, congestion-free lines and sufficient inertia all at once.
As renewables rise this becomes costly — volatile and even negative wholesale prices, surging redispatch expenditure and growing curtailment.
The neglected question: once the grid is asynchronous and packetised, how should balance, congestion and inertia be priced and managed?
How it proceeds
Formalise two synchronous-grid challenges — power balance and transmission congestion — with standard electricity-market theory, then show how an A-grid shifts from power balance to energy balance.
Energy Routers make demand price-elastic and a storage buffer trims net load, so the market clears one step lower in the merit order (from gas at €90/MWh to coal at €50/MWh in the worked example).
A Local Market Operator runs a continuous double auction with predictive forecasting, elasticity mapping and autonomous bidding; line capacity becomes a variable inside the auction (Flow ≤ Capacity) and congestion is priced continuously and locally rather than corrected after the fact through redispatch.
Design risks are discussed: sensitivity of dynamic pricing to forecasting error, and the incentives of incumbent grid operators earning rents on sunk assets.
SAFErGrid economic value
Price elasticity plus a local buffer move the clearing price down the merit order; congestion is priced continuously and locally instead of being corrected after the fact.
Four priority areas for elaboration and improvement
The main challenge is to show why and how SAFErGrid can address grid-management challenges better than incremental adjustments to the existing grid.
Compare against a (reformed) synchronous grid. Which part of the economic value in the paper is unique to SAFErGrid and cannot be obtained from incremental reforms of the existing grid?
The pricing rules are currently proportional to the derivative of Action Energy or the inverse of buffer energy, not modelled as marginal costs or shadow prices. Both pricing equations need to be grounded in an optimisation by the Local Market Operator.
The clearing condition abstracts from network topology, delivery intervals, route feasibility, storage ownership and coordination among neighbouring LMOs. The auction architecture must be specified in depth: bidding, dispatch, cross-grid coordination, congestion allocation and the LMO's decision rights.
The €90 → €50/MWh reduction comes from delaying demand and discharging 30 MW from a buffer. A total-surplus or system-cost metric is needed that accounts for router and buffer costs, losses, communications, and the distribution of gains between flexible and inflexible users.
Working stream · Paper 02
02
How is inertia priced?
Inertia as a Priced, Local Market Service
£1.95bn
UK Stability Pathfinders spend → est. £14.9bn saved
$30–90m/yr
ERCOT payments to BESS for fast frequency response
€4.2bn
German redispatch cost in 2022 — an inertia symptom
Read the draft of paper 02 here →
What this work package addresses
Spinning turbines store kinetic energy that slows the rate of change of frequency; converter-decoupled renewables carry no rotating mass, so system inertia falls as their share rises.
Low inertia has caused near-collapses — the CESA split of 8 January 2021 and the Iberian blackout of 28 April 2025 — turning stability from a free by-product into a high-cost, procured service.
Today inertia is shadow-priced through redispatch: the must-run unit the TSO keeps online sets the cost, chosen after the merit order with no competitive discipline.
How it proceeds
SAFErGrid replaces RoCoF with Action Energy, a local energy-domain stability metric; the Energy Router turns the required Action Energy into a price signal, and virtual inertia is supplied by BESS along a merit-order curve.
Inertia is formalised as a club good: compartmentalisation shrinks a continent-wide free-rider problem into a small, tractable local one, excludable via a metered, priced DC interconnection.
A welfare comparison shows an explicit virtual-inertia market can always replicate — and only improve on — the shadow-cost dispatch of TSO redispatch, with gains rising as provider costs diverge.
A real-options perspective treats a charged buffer as a call option on a stability event, whose value rises with volatility; the long-run revenue-adequacy (“missing money”) problem is addressed through capacity contracts or availability payments.
SAFErGrid economic value
Virtual inertia becomes a traded service whose price falls as batteries scale; volatility that threatens a synchronous grid becomes option value in a storage-rich one.
Four priority areas for elaboration and improvement
Ensure in particular that the concepts of synchronous and virtual inertia are correctly interpreted and explained from an engineering perspective.
The mathematics needs a unified technical foundation. It is not yet shown how the Action Energy and price-signal equations map into the specific virtual-inertia capacity supplied.
The club-good model assumes that faults cannot propagate and frequency effects are zero outside neighbouring cells, that excludability within a cell is unnecessary, and that price-responsive appliances can provide physical stabilisation — whereas prices and fail-safe automation are distinct mechanisms.
Within a single A-grid the supply of qualified BESS or converter providers is geographically restricted while demand for stability is near-vertical, so one or a few providers may dominate. Market design must be linked to bidding incentives and market power — long-term contracts, regulated offers or alternative procurement rules may be needed.
The Black-Scholes framework takes shortcuts. Modelling competitive clearing below annualised CAPEX as a structural market failure requires defining a long-run equilibrium mechanism.
Working stream · Paper 03
03
What are the implications for innovation?
Technology, Platforms & Real Options
3
innovation channels: technology, platforms, real options
4
layers: A-grid, routing, streaming, application
β < 1
flexibility as insurance — lower systematic risk
Read the draft of paper 03 here →
What this work package addresses
Beyond fixing balance, inertia and congestion, the architecture is itself a source of innovation — but much of it still has to be invented.
A layered, internet-like grid of autonomous sub-grids connected by smart Energy Routers opens three related channels for innovation: technology, platforms and finance.
How it proceeds
Technology & R&D: a to-do list for engineers — mass-producible bidirectional Energy Routers (solid-state transformers on SiC/GaN), deterministic sub-millisecond communications (TSN, 5G/6G URLLC, PTP), real-time Action-Energy sensing and grid-forming inverters.
Platform business models: separating physical routing (Layers 1–3) from a programmable Energy Application Layer creates a multi-sided platform on which third parties build dynamic pricing, quality-of-service contracts and peer-to-peer trading, with the router earning an app-store-style routing fee.
Real options: each router-plus-buffer is a call option on flexibility whose value rises with volatility; via CAPM, decoupling can lower systematic risk (β) — routers isolate shocks, costs shift from volatile fossil OPEX to near-riskless CAPEX, and buffers earn most during system stress.
SAFErGrid economic value
A shortcoming of the old grid — volatility — becomes a source of value in the new one; the open challenge is keeping the platform operator from exercising monopoly power over its ecosystem.
Four priority areas for elaboration and improvement
Double-check all engineering claims.
Explicitly isolate the incremental effects of SAFErGrid's unique features — compartmentalisation, asynchronisation, buffering and layered programmability — to show they offer distinct innovation potential compared with existing grid innovations.
What is a router? Establish a single canonical architecture specifying A-grid scale, router placement and responsibilities.
A unified, consistent model is needed with a defined router objective, explicit state-of-charge dynamics and a benchmark equilibrium. At present the router is introduced as a profit-making Stackelberg leader charging a fee, yet later assigned a social-welfare objective.
The Black-Scholes formulation raises questions about the precise nature of the “flexibility asset”. Claims that the synchronous grid has a beta of at least one, or that SAFErGrid might achieve a negative beta, require better modelling.
Working stream · Paper 04
04
What are the implications for household welfare?
Lower and Fairer Household Bills
59%
renewable share of German electricity (2025)
€116/mo
average household bill — double its 2005 level
~650,000
households in energy poverty attributable to grid fees
Read the draft of paper 04 here →
What this work package addresses
The German puzzle: renewables reached 59% of supply and pushed generation costs down, yet households pay among the highest electricity prices in the world and energy poverty is rising.
The culprit is the grid-fee component of the bill — 25–30% of it — levied to recover the cost of congestion and redispatch on the centralised synchronous grid, and regressive in four ways.
Current reforms — dynamic tariffs, time-variable grid fees under §14a EnWG, a €6.5bn subsidy — treat the symptom, and risk rewarding households with heat pumps, EVs and batteries while poorer households face a net cost increase.
How it proceeds
Measure energy poverty with the Ten-Percent Rule, Low-Income High-Cost, subjective and arrears indicators; identify one-person, non-working and lower-education households as most at risk.
Trace the cost chain from redispatch to grid fees to household tariffs, showing why the fixed component, self-consumption by wealthier homes, regional exposure and industrial exemptions make fees regressive.
Channel one — the level of the bill: eliminating the redispatch that drives grid fees; grid fees alone account for roughly 650,000 households in energy poverty, about 15% of the national rate.
Channel two — the structure of the bill: Quality-of-Service pricing lets a household pick a lower reliability tier for flexible appliances, so fixed costs are recovered from those most willing and able to pay rather than spread uniformly and regressively.
SAFErGrid economic value
Two channels out of household energy poverty: lower average bills and a fairer bill structure — while promoting access to smart meters and home energy management.
Four priority areas for elaboration and improvement
The paper must separate what is unique to asynchrony from generic demand-side flexibility already being added to the synchronous grid.
What is the exact role of redispatch in prices, and its pass-through rate to household tariffs? Tariffs are also shaped by grid operation, maintenance, expansion, reinforcement and capital costs.
The claim is not yet credible. A microsimulation or bounding exercise using household income, electricity consumption and attributable tariff reductions is needed.
For Quality-of-Service pricing to improve welfare, participation rates, willingness to pay, tier enforcement and interruption rules must be modelled — and the cost and financing of the smart-meter roll-out included.
The paper does not yet fully distinguish benefits unique to asynchronous routing and store-and-forward buffering from the generic benefits of demand-side flexibility already being incorporated into the synchronous grid.